Ensure that SOP as well as pre-takeoff checklists support flight crew action during take-off

Good airmanship entails that, before takeoff, pilots brief all relevant changes which were not previously briefed, including any last-minute changes. Standard Operating Procedures and their training must also include the practice of always checking the FMA displays when changes are entered into the AFCS. The final checks in the takeoff position, prior to applying takeoff power, should include the correct runway, compass headings and pressing the TO/GA button and checking the correct modes on the FMA. Checklists should be written in such a manner that they support correct practices in critical phases of the flight. The need is heightened when routines are disturbed, such as with the erroneous compass indications on this flight. Furthermore, on this flight the FMS had to be reprogrammed in a situation in which it cancelled the previously made TO/GA selection during a phase of the flight where, as per the checklists, it would no longer be checked.

Safety Investigation Authority, Finland recommends that the operator ensure that Standard Operating Procedures as well as pre-takeoff checklists support flight crew action when it comes to confirming the critical takeoff-related issues immediately before takeoff.

Good airmanship entails that, before takeoff, pilots brief all relevant changes which were not previously briefed, including any last-minute changes. Standard Operating Procedures and their training must also include the practice of always checking the FMA displays when changes are entered into the AFCS. The final checks in the takeoff position, prior to applying takeoff power, should include the correct runway, compass headings and pressing the TO/GA button and checking the correct modes on the FMA. Checklists should be written in such a manner that they support correct practices in critical phases of the flight. The need is heightened when routines are disturbed, such as with the erroneous compass indications on this flight. Furthermore, on this flight the FMS had to be reprogrammed in a situation in which it cancelled the previously made TO/GA selection during a phase of the flight where, as per the checklists, it would no longer be checked.