C5/​2010M MS NA­JADEN (FIN), Col­li­sion with the Ca­land Bridge in the Port of Rot­ter­dam, Nether­lands, on 2 June 2010

26.06.2012

The Finnish dry cargo vessel NAJADEN and the car carrier PALMELA informed somewhat after 20.00 on 2 June 2010 to the VMC-ZWN Traffic Control Centre in south-western Holland controlling the Caland Bridge that they needed the bridge to be opened so that they could sail from the Brittanniehaven towards the Caland Canal. The PALMELA reported first, and after her the NAJADEN. The NAJADEN told that she wanted to use the same bridge opening as the PALMELA.

It can be concluded from the radar images later published by the Port of Rotterdam Authority, Division Harbourmaster that two river boats sailed under the fixed part of the bridge during the opening, one of which, the ALEXIA, sailed in the same direction as the NAJADEN and the PALMELA.

During the opening of the bridge, the bridge operator trainee, who at the moment managed the Caland Bridge, monitored the traffic situation by browsing camera pictures, which could be seen in the control table. On the basis of this information the bridge operator trainee concluded that the dry cargo vessel NAJADEN was passing beneath the bridge at a certain moment. In all probability, the bridge operator trainee mistook the river boat ALEXIA, which was passing the fixed part of the bridge, to be the NAJADEN. The bridge operator trainee waited until the ALEXIA had passed beneath the bridge and started the lowering procedure, which means that the movable part of the Caland Bridge closes down. At that moment the NAJADEN informed by VHF radiotelephone that she had not yet passed beneath the bridge. The bridge operator trainee pressed the stop button. The lift bridge stopped by a slow stop approximately six metres below its upmost position.

At 20.42 the NAJADEN reported that she had been hit by the bridge. The part of the bridge to be lifted/lowered hit the roof of the navigating bridge and destroyed almost all equipment on the roof of the navigating bridge and tore off the funnel of the vessel.

The accident had all the ingredients to become fatal with reference to the safety of human life. Personal damages were, however, only just avoided.

An investigation on the incident was carried out in Holland, and the material of this investigation was placed at the disposal of the Safety Investigation Authority, Finland. The inadequate training of the bridge operator trainee, inadequate supervision, the lack of a formal training programme and the lack of a quick, remotely-used emergency stop of the bridge constituted the causes and underlying factors of the accident.

The Safety Investigation Authority, Finland recommends that the VMC-ZWN takes actions so that a real-time, AIS-based radar image of the port area would be available, in addition to video monitoring, in the operating centre of remote-operated bridges. It is also recommended that the VMC-ZWN investigates the visibility of shipping, thereby taking into account the various camera locations and the ergonomics regarding the use of the camera images, and takes appropriate action if improvements are possible. In addition it is recommended that the VMC-ZWN draws a clear procedure requirement on the opening of the bridge and on the final notification to be given after the passing beneath the bridge has been completed. The Safety Investigation Authority, Finland recommends to the Rijkwaterstaat that it includes identifying different vessels and vessel types, goals and responsibilities of trainee and supervisor as part of the training programme and that it would be subject to the safety management system of Rijkswaterstaat.