C1/2000M ms OCEAN PRIDE, grounding at Orrengrund 6.3.2000
14.03.2003
06.03.2000
14.03.2003
Marine (M)
C1/2000M
Accident
Completed
The Norwegian cargo vessel OCEAN PRIDE owned by the Pride-Petrus Company grounded in the Finnish archipelago at Orrengrund in the evening of the 6th of March 2000. The vessel was registered at the Norwegian NIS register and had a seven member multinational crew. The vessel was bound for Kotka from Ventspils.
A southerly storm was prevailing in the Orrengrund area with gusts up to 24 m/s. The visibility was poor. The master got the advice to proceed to an unofficial pilot boarding place at the western tip of the Orrengrund island. The master regarded this as an order and followed it. When the mate left the bridge to pick up the pilot the master was left alone on the bridge.
Slightly before the official pilot boarding place the master turned to port with the autopilot to heading 000 towards the western tip of the Orrengrund Island. Next, he tried to turn with the autopilot further to port to heading 340 with the intention to round the west shore of the Orren-grund island, but the steering gear did not react. He switched to manual but the steering gear did not obey his orders. He tried the autopilot again and manual steering the second time in vain. The steering gear did not respond. The Master’s next move was to turn the emergency steering wheel to port. The steering gear responded but slowly. The vessel was already too close to the shore and stranding could not be avoided. The Master’s last operational measures aimed to limit the consequences of the grounding. The imminent causes of the accident were the storm, bad visibility, steering gear failure and poor manual steering system.
The investigation found several hidden latent errors with regard to the vessel. The master did not know the procedures related to the unofficial pilot boarding place. He was not aware of the fact that the VTS centre will not provide steering commands for reaching the new pilot boarding place.
The previous master had requested an increase in the manning for the Baltic traffic but the company had not agreed. The small manning led to a situation were the master had to violate the STCW rules for fitness on duty for his own part. The master was alone and there was not a one-man navigation and steering point. He had to navigate with the radar in poor visibility and he had to steer simultaneously. The master had to deviate from his original passage plan. This situation would have required accurate steering commands by the pilot organisation but the master did not get the information he needed.