The Finnish Lifeboat In­sti­tu­tion’s Emmi Lifeboat crash­ing into an islet in the Es­poo arch­i­pel­ago on 26 Oc­to­ber 2024 at ap­prox­i­mately 8:55 p.m.

23.12.2024

Course of events

The Emmi Lifeboat is a lifeboat designed for demanding rescue operations. Emmi is equipped with modern navigation and rescue equipment.

Emmi embarked on a night driving exercise from the island base in the Espoo archipelago, towards the Mellsten harbour, on 26 October 2024 at 8:25 p.m. The boat carried a crew of five. Before departure, the boat crew went through the route plan by discussing it, as the boat did not have any marker map boards in accordance with the cabin work procedure of the Finnish Lifeboat Institution. At the end of the route, there was a steep turning point to the left towards the Mellsten harbour. In order to build up experience on fast driving, a decision was made to keep the boat sliding all the way, which was why the travel speed was approximately 30 knots. The visibility was approximately five nautical miles, i.e. less than 10 km (1 nautical mile is 1,852 m) and there were no waves.

After departure, the boat was brought to a slide by increasing the speed. During the voyage, the communication between the navigator and the helmsman mainly followed the cabin work instructions for fast vessels. When approaching the turn leading to the accident, the navigator informed the helmsman that the next turn to the left would be steep (almost 50 degrees) and would take place close to the islet ahead.

The navigator followed the approach to the turning point from the radar display and told the helmsman to start turning on the basis of their area knowledge and experience. The radar display was clear and the objects on it were verified by another electronic navigation system. For this reason, it was not considered necessary to use a spotlight or reduce the speed. The communication did not discuss the new direction after the familiar turn or the steering/radar signal, which the navigator and helmsman were familiar with beforehand.

During the turn, the speed of the boat decreased to approximately 17 knots. In the middle of the turn, the navigator noticed that the right side light of the boat was illuminating the trees of the nearby islet. Soon after this, the boat collided with the islet in question, right side first. As a result of the collision, crew members were bruised, the chief’s chair was detached from its fasteners and a leak occurred on the boat.

After the accident, the boat crew first ensured each other’s state of health and only then started resolving the situation. The chief of the boat reported the accident to the Maritime Rescue Subcentre MRSC Helsinki, together with their plan to drive to the nearby Mellsten harbour because the boat had no risk of sinking and its machinery and steering systems were in working order. The boat arrived at the Mellsten harbour at approximately 9:10 p.m., where the Espoo Maritime Rescue Association’s land organisation was waiting for it. The preparedness officer of the Finnish Lifeboat Institution was informed of the incident by telephone. The decision had been made to lift the boat ashore to inspect the damage.

Due to the contusions of the crew, an emergency medical care unit had been ordered on site. A defusing session was organised for the crew the day after the accident.

Background information

The preparation of the departure for the accident voyage was carried out by locally applying the Finnish Lifeboat Institution’s cabin work instructions for fast vessels. In the fast-driving exercise, one of the three chief-level seafarers served as the chief, one as a helmsman and one as a navigator. They were all already familiar with the operating area and the seaway used, also when operating in the dark.

The aim of the Finnish Lifeboat Institution’s Cabin Work instructions is to harmonise the working methods of patrol boat cabin crews, and the communication used in the work to ensure and improve maritime safety. The instructions emphasise the significance of communication between the navigator and the helmsman, as well as the importance of vigilance of the entire cabin crew in ensuring safety. Everyone has the right and obligation to interrupt the operation by means of the “VENE SEIS” (“Stop the boat”) command, in which case it is repeated, the boat is stopped and the reason for the command is determined before the task or voyage is continued. The command was not used during the accident voyage.

The cabin work instructions deal with error management and communication. According to the instructions, it is possible that multiple protection mechanisms may also deceive crews to believe that all risks and hazards are under control. The guide also highlights the model of shared leadership as a non-technical means of protection and its suitability for experienced crews as a responsibility-sharing and participatory operating model. Based on this, for example, one member of the steering group makes so-called critical decisions, for example on turns, and the other assesses their content, i.e. monitors, which aims to increase safety. In this case, the navigator gave the turn order that was executed by the helmsman.

The complexity of the turn leading to the collision had already been acknowledged during route planning. However, this did not spark a debate on possible speed reductions or the use of spotlights. The route was familiar, the chief, the navigator and the helmsman knew it, and the conditions favoured practising fast driving. Anticipating the fateful turn on the familiar seaway was facilitated by a red mooring buoy nearby, which was on the right side of the route when driving towards Mellsten. The use of the boat radar range ring and the electronic bearing line was insufficient when preparing for the steep turn and during the turn, due to their difficult use.

Observations

Maritime rescue vessels of the Finnish Lifeboat Institution often operate in demanding conditions, which also requires training in demanding conditions in the archipelago, on the coast and on the open sea.

Crews are often composed of more experienced maritime rescue personnel and seafarers, as well as trainees, who are trained and encouraged to follow the principles of shared leadership. This aims at making all observations affecting safety heard. Ultimately, this is done by means of the “VENE SEIS” (“Stop the boat”) command. If this is not expressed, then the shared assumption is a sufficient sense of security and the assumption that the journey can continue safely.

The use of radar and electronic nautical chart systems is emphasised when operating in the dark or in poor visibility conditions, when also the estimation of distances becomes more challenging. Lifeboat Emmi’s turn in the new direction was delayed, and in the middle of the turn, it collided right side first with the islet ahead. When starting the turn, the exact distance or position of the boat in relation to the islet was not known to the maritime personnel, in sufficient detail.

The Safety Investigation Authority does not initiate a safety investigation on the incident, but emphasises the importance of careful route planning, preparation and driving, as well as safe situational speed.

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